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STANDARD OF PROOF IN PARENTAL
RIGHTS TERMINATION: SANTOSKY
v. KR4MER
HEN a child has been neglected by his parents, the state may
normally step in to protect him. New York law permits involuntary termination of parental rights when a child is shown to
be neglected.' The termination proceeding consists of a fact-finding hearing, in which the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the child has been permanently neglected,2 and a dispositional hearing to
ascertain which placement would serve the child's best interests. 3 Bernhardt S. Kramer, the Commissioner of the Ulster County, New York, Department of Social Services, initiated such proceedings in October 1978 to
terminate the parental rights of John Santosky II and Annie Santosky in
their three children. Although the Santoskys immediately challenged the
constitutionality of the New York Family Court Act's preponderance of
the evidence standard for proving neglect, the family court applied this
statutory standard and ruled that the Santoskys' parental rights should be
terminated. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed
the decision, 4 and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the Santoskys' appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question.5 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, vacated andremanded: In
a proceeding for involuntary termination of parents' rights in their natural
child, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment demands that
the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).
I.

DUE PROCESS, THE FAMILY, AND STANDARDS OF PROOF

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that no
state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."' 6 Due process thus restricts the ways in which state legislaI. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b(4)(d), (7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see also
infra note 136.
2. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-1982).
3. Id §§ 623, 631. The dispositional hearing was not at issue in Santosky v. Kramer
because the challenged standard of proof applies only to the fact-finding hearing.
4. In re John AA, 75 A.D.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (1980).

5. The dismissal is noted sub nom; In re Apel, 432 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1980), but the opinion is not published.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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tures may limit individual freedoms. 7 When life, liberty, or property is at
stake, the state must provide certain procedural protections to ensure that
its action complies with the due process clause. 8 The basic requirement of
due process is fairness to the individual. 9 The procedural protections essential to achieving fundamental fairness include adequate notice of the
basis for the action, a neutral decisionmaker, an opportunity to present
evidence and witnesses, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
the right to representation by counsel, and a final decision based on a record that includes a statement of the reasons for the decision.' 0 In determining the adequacy of procedural safeguards, the Supreme Court has
traditionally balanced the rights of the individual against the government's
interest in limiting those rights." A parental rights termination case involves a balancing of competing interests,' 2 including the parents' interest
in maintaining the care and custody of their child,' 3 the state's interest in
the welfare of the child,14 and the child's interest in being free from abuse
and neglect. 15 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that applying the due process clause to a proceeding to decide whether a parent's
relationship with his natural child should be severed is "an uncertain enterprise" in which the court must consider the various interests at stake in
order to determine what procedure meets the requisites of due process and
constitutes fundamental fairness to the parties involved.' 6 One means of
ensuring a fair balance between the rights of individuals and the legitimate
concerns of the state is to have an appropriate standard of proof.' 7 The8
various jurisdictions have disagreed as to what standard should be used.'
The parent's interest in preventing the dissolution of his parental rights
warrants deference in the balancing process of a custody proceeding because the parent stands to suffer a substantial loss if his parental rights are
7.

J. NOWAK,

R.

ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

476

(1978).

8. Id at 477. The range of interests protected by the due process clause is not infinite,
however, and if the interest in question does not fall within one of the areas encompassed by
the fourteenth amendment, due process requirements do not apply. Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972).
9. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1965); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 7, at 483, 501.

10. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 499; see also Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (individual's right to Social
Security benefits versus government's interest in terminating benefits to recipients no longer
eligible); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-83 (1972) (comparing parolee's interest in
continued liberty with governmental interest in restricting that liberty); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-96 (1961) (balancing employment interests of naval gun factory employee with government's security interests).
12. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); see also infra
notes 102-03.

13. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); infra notes 19-30 and
accompanying text.
14. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
15. See infra notes 59, 151-52 and accompanying text.
16. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
17. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
18. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
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terminated. 19 The Supreme Court at an early date recognized an individual's right to establish a home and bring up children as one of the freedoms protected by the fourteenth amendment. 20 The Court's inherent
respect for the sanctity of the family 2' has created a strong presumption
that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in their child's best interests, 22 and that, therefore, the duty to care for and nurture the child should
normally reside with the parents. 23 Early Supreme Court decisions concerned the parents' right to dictate specific aspects of their child's upbring24
ing rather than the right to custody; the Court finally addressed the child
custody issue in Stanley v. Illinois.25 In that case the Court characterized
the rights to conceive and raise one's children as "essential," as "basic civil
rights of man," and as "rights far more precious .

.

. than property

rights."'26 In recent years the Court has indicated even greater confidence
in the parent's competence to make important decisions regarding the upbringing of children. 27 Thus, in seeking the involuntary termination of
parental rights, a state confronts not only the ordinary procedural requirement of proving its allegation of parental unfitness, but also the deepseated notion that, in most cases, parents "generally do act in the child's
best interests."' 28 This assumption was apparent in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services,29 a parental rights termination case in which the Court
stated: "If the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivation. .

.

. A parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to

30
terminate his or her parental status is, therefore, a commanding one."
Nevertheless, the state is not without support for its intervention into the
parent-child relationship. As the Court noted in Lassiter, the state has an
urgent interest in the child's welfare. 3 ' The state's right and obligation to
guard the child's well-being arise from its function as parens patriae. 32 In

19. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972).
20. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
21. In Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), in which the Court held
unconstitutional a zoning ordinance prohibiting an extended family from residing together
in a single household, the Court noted that the family is an institution "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."
22. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
23. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

24. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (upheld parents'
right to send their child to private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)
(struck down statute forbidding teaching of foreign languages to school children and held
that parent, not state, must be one to supervise child's education).
25. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
26. Id. at 651.
27. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding state statute permitting
parents to have their minor children committed for mental health treatment); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents may substitute private instruction of their highschool-aged children for public education).
28. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
29. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
30. Id. at 27.
31. Id
32. "Parenspatriae,literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of the
state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to act for themselves such
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Prince v. Massachusetts the Court stated that the state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the
child's welfare. 33 The opinion defined the parens patriae doctrine as a
governmental duty to assure proper development of the child: "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.
impeding restraints and dangers within a broad
It may secure this against
'34
range of selection."
Outside the realm of parental rights termination, the state's interest has
often been indistinguishable from that of the parents. For example, in
Ginsberg v. New York 35 the Court upheld a city ordinance prohibiting the
sale of obscene materials to minors and found that regulation for the welfare of children is within state constitutional power. 36 The Court noted
that because parents are charged with the responsibility for rearing their
children, they are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge
of that responsibility. 37 Ideally, the interest of the state as parens patriae
should be identical to that of the parents. 38 A parental rights termination
proceeding is, however, a unique situation, because the state's interest does
not coincide with the parents'; in such a case, the state seeks not simply to
39
infringe upon the parents' interest but to end it.
The third interest at stake in a parental rights termination case is that of
the child. Statutes authorizing termination typically focus upon serving
the child's best interests. 4° Although the Supreme Court has emphasized
the importance of the child's interests in a custody case, 4 1 it has been reluctant to accord the child's interests the same status as the parents'. 42 Even
when the interests of parent and child do not conflict, the Court has eleas juveniles, the insane, or the unknown." West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
33. 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944). The state may restrict the parents' control, for example, by
requiring school attendance and, as it did in this case, regulating child labor. Id at 166.
34. Id at 168. For additional discussion of the doctrine of parens patriae, see Cogan,
Juvenile Law, Before andAfter the Entranceof "Parens Patriae", 22 S.C.L. REv. 147 (1970);
Curtis, The Checkered Career of ParensPatriae." The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DE PAUL
L. REV. 895 (1976).
35. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
36. Id. at 639.
37. Id
38. Thus, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), the statutes that the Court held unconstitutional disserved the interests
of both the state and the parent.
39. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
40. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.25 (1970 & Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 631 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(c) (1981);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1982).
41. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953).
42. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979). In Parham the Court implied that
the due process rights of parents and children are not identical in custody cases. The specific
holding was that no constitutional mandate exists to provide a formal hearing before a minor is committed to a mental health treatment facility on his parents' application. Id Conversely, the Court in the same year championed the due process rights of adults in
involuntary commitment proceedings. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); see infra
notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
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vated the adult's interests above those of the child.4 3 This attitude is evident in the Court's treatment of juvenile delinquents. Although a juvenile
44
is entitled to due process in proceedings to determine his delinquency,
due process does not include a right to jury trial in juvenile court proceedings.45 Similarly, due process does not require that corporal punishment
of minors in public schools be preceded by notice and hearing. 46 These
decisions indicate that a child's interest may be entitled to very limited due
process protection when it competes with the interest of an adult. The
Court addressed this apparent inconsistency between the rights of adults
and children in Bellotti v. Baird,47 in which it enumerated three factors to
support its conclusion that a child's constitutional rights cannot be equated
with those of an adult: 48 a child's vulnerability, 49 his inability to make
critical decisions for himself,5 0 and the importance of the parental role in
child-rearing. 5'
The child, however, is not without constitutional rights, and recent
Supreme
Court decisions have established a minor's rights to be similar
to,5 2 if not indistinguishable from, 53 an adult's. On occasion the Court has
subordinated the parent's rights to the child's. 5 4 In PlannedParenthoodv.
Danforth55 the Court stated: "Constitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
43. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972). The Court in Yoder
stated: "It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here.., and it is their right of free
exercise, not that of their children, that must determine [the state's] power to impose criminal penalties on the parents." While Yoder was a case in which the rights of parent and
child did not conflict, the fact that the decision was based solely on the parents' rights of free
exercise and not the children's rights reveals the Court's opinion that adults' interests are
superior to children's interests. See also Garvey, Freedomand Choice in ConstitutionalLaw,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1756, 1778-79 (1981):
It is odd. . . that when parents and the state are fighting about how the child
will be educated, the decision so often turns simply on a consideration of the
parents'due process and free exercise rights. One reason for this peculiarity is
that laws saying when and where children have to go to school and what they
have to do there are enforced against the parents. . . . A second and more
persuasive reason is the reluctance of the courts to recognize constitutionally
protected freedoms for children in matters that their parents usually decide for
them.
44. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). Gault, however, also recognized the parents' rights to
certain procedural protections. Id at 34.
45. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
46. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
47. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
48. Id at 634.
49. Id The child's vulnerability was also the apparent basis for the state's power to
prohibit the sale of obscene material to a minor in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968).
50. 443 U.S. at 634. In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979), the Court noted that
"[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions. . . . Parents can and must make those judgments."
51. 443 U.S. at 634.
52. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
53. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
54. See id at 642-43 (Court held unconstitutional state law requiring parental consultation before minor may seek court-ordered abortion).
55. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess constitutional rights."'5 6 While recognizing a minor's right to make
her own decision regarding abortion, 57 the Court nevertheless concluded
that the state can regulate minors to some extent when the regulation
serves some significant state interest that is not present in the case of an
adult.5 8 Thus, although children have rights, a child's constitutional status
is still precarious; only a narrow base of constitutional decisions supports
the interest of the abused or neglected child.5 9 Moreover, a child has no
constitutional rights against his parents.60 If a child is abused or neglected,
however, he clearly has an interest in avoiding a family court decision that
leaves him in an abusive home environment. This interest is the interest
that is weighed against the parents' right to retain custody.
The procedural protections prescribed by the state in a termination case
affect the risk of erroneous determination of each interest at stake. These
protections include the standard of proof that the state must meet in showing that a child is abused or neglected. 6 ' A high standard of proof increases the likelihood that a child will be forced to remain with parents
who are unfit to raise him, while a low standard creates a risk that parental
rights will be erroneously severed. 62 Settling on the proper standard of
therefore involves a careful weighing of
proof for a termination proceeding
63
the interests of every party.
A standard of proof serves to communicate to the factfinder the degree
of confidence he should have that his conclusions are correct.6 4 Consequently, a higher standard of proof is ordinarily required in criminal cases,
65
because the defendant's freedom from actual confinement is threatened,
while a lesser standard applies in most civil actions, because the endangered interest is typically monetary. 66 The standard of proof thus reflects
56. Id at 74; see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (juvenile delinquent is entitled
to protection of fifth amendment double jeopardy clause); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975) (high school student facing temporary suspension has property and liberty interests
that qualify for due process protection, including notice and hearing); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (suspension of public school students
for wearing black armbands in protest of Vietnam War violated students' first amendment
right to freedom of speech or expression).
57. 428 U.S. at 74.
58. Id at 75.
59. Note, Family Law-Standardof Proof- "Clearand Convincing Evidence" Standard
of Proof Will Be Required in All Proceedingsfor Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship, In re G.M., 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 559, 567 (1980); see also Herrera v. Herrera,
409 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. 1966); Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 252, 28 S.W. 281, 282 (1894).
60. Wingo & Freytag, Decisions Within the Family: A Clash of ConstitutionalRights, 67
IOWA L. REV. 401, 401 n.I (1982).

61. Hernandez v. State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 23 Ariz. 32, 530 P.2d
389, 393 (1975).
62. Id
63. In re N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134, 139-40 (S.D. 1978).
64. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
65. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
66. See, e.g., Carson Inv. Co. v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 26 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.
1928); Jones v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1965); Moore v. Stone, 36 S.W. 909
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896); see also 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 65, § 2498.
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the value that society, through its courts, places on a particular right or
activity. Conversely, because the risk of erroneous outcome is charged to
one or the other of the litigating parties, the prescribed measure of proof
the comparative disutility of each
also indicates society's assessment of
67
type of possible erroneous decision.
Generally, the standard of proof falls within one of three basic categories or levels of proof.68 The highest level, normally characterized as
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt," is virtually mandatory in criminal
cases 69 and juvenile delinquency adjudications. 70 This standard is
designed to eliminate the chance of an erroneous conviction, with the result that society imposes the risk of error in criminal cases almost entirely
upon itself.7 ' In contrast, the least stringent measure of proof, and one
that is applicable to most civil cases, is the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Literally, this standard requires only a quantitative comparison of the evidence, so that the risk of error is shared equally by all
parties to the action. 72 When the threatened interest is not a person's freedom from confinement but nevertheless is one of greater import than a
monetary concern, a third, intermediate standard is often employed that
requires proof by "clear and convincing" evidence. 73 For example, the
Supreme Court has demanded proof by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence" in deportation 74 and denaturalization 75 proceedings because
of the potentially drastic consequences of such proceedings. 76 Clear and
convincing evidence has also been 77required in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or undue influence.
While the suggestion has been made that no meaningful distinctions
among varying standards of proof exist because measuring the "intensity
of human belief'7 8 is impossible, the Supreme Court has disavowed any
such skepticism. 79 Although the labels used for alternative standards of
proof are vague and do not provide a very clear guide to decisionmaking,
the choice of a particular standard reflects a fundamental assessment of the
comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations.8 0
Standard of proof was not an issue of federal constitutional concern
67. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).

68. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
69. See id.

70. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
71. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
72. Id at 423.

73. Id at 424. The Court noted that this standard of proof has been variously defined
to require "clear," "cogent," "unequivocal," or "convincing" evidence. Id
74. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).

75. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S.
660, 663 (1958); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 142 (1943).

76. See Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966); see
also Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957).
77. 9 J.WIGMORE, supra note 65, at 329.

78. Id at 325.
79. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. Id at 369-70.
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prior to the holding in In re Winship that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is necessary in juvenile delinquency adjudications. 8' In civil cases it remains a topic that is ordinarily not of constitutional significance. 8 2 The
exception to this rule isAddington v. Texas, 83 in which the Court ruled that
an individual's liberty interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such importance that due process requires a showing of clear
and convincing evidence to justify confining an individual to a mental institution. 84 Rejecting the holding of the Supreme Court of Texas that a
mere preponderance of the evidence was sufficient,8 5 the Court stated that
requiring a higher standard was one way of impressing the factfinder with
the importance of his decision and thereby reducing the chances of erroneous commitment.8 6 The Court, refusing to invoke the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard, 87 selected the intermediate clear and convincing evidence
standard, or some equivalent measure of proof, which "strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the
state."'8 8 Use of this standard indicates the existence of a right so signifibe adequately protected by a preponderance of the
cant that it would not
89
standard.
evidence
The standard of proof in parental rights termination proceedings varies
among the states that provide for termination. 90 The general belief that
children's interests are ordinarily best served by allowing their parents to
retain custody 9 ' is evidenced by the fact that some states do not possess a
mechanism for involuntary termination. 92 Of the states that permit involuntary termination, the majority require, either by statute or by judicial
decision, that the state prove its case by clear and convincing evidence or
its equivalent. 93 Two states require the stricter standard of proof beyond a
81. Id at 368; see Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions,andBurden of Proofin the
CriminalLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1328 (1979).
82. See Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976).
83. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
84. Id at 433.
85. State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511, 511 (Tex. 1977), vacated, 441 U.S. 418 (1978).
86. 441 U.S. at 427.
87. Id at 428-29. The Court stated four reasons that the highest standard of proof was
inappropriate: the nonpunitive nature of a commitment proceeding compared with a criminal case; the historic reservation of this standard for criminal matters; the undesirability of
imposing the entire risk of error upon society; and the difficulty of proving mental illness
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id
88. Id at 431.
89. Id at 427.
90. See generally Katz, Howe & McGrath, ChildNeglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q.
1 (1975).
91. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
92. Eg., Vermont, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Kentucky.
93. The following state statutes require clear and convincing evidence or its equivalent:
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West 1982); GA. CODE
§§ 24A-2201(c), 24A-3201 (1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.8 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.,

tit. 22, § 4055.l(B)(2) (Supp. 1982-1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.25 (Supp. 19821983); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.447.2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-4(J)
(Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e) (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35
(Page 1976 and Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(d) (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-
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reasonable doubt.94 Only a handful of state statutes specify a preponderance standard, 95 and in at least one of those states that standard has been
held to violate a parent's due process rights. 96 Two state supreme courts
that upheld statutory preponderance standards in termination proceedings
did so with an express goal of balancing the interests of parent and child,
rather than concentrating solely on the parents' interests. 97 Finally, some
state termination statutes do not prescribe a standard of proof. 98
Lower federal courts have rarely been called upon to comment on due
process in parental rights termination cases, because the family is a traditional area of state concern. The two federal courts that have addressed
the topic of standard of proof for involuntary termination have both held
that the state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. 99
Thus, despite inconsistency among individual state statutes and holdings,
the general tenor of parental rights termination law has been one of solicitude for the parents' custody rights, characterized by a higher standard-of246(d) (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 16.1-283(B) (1982); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2(c) (1980); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 48.3 1(1) (Supp. 1981-1982).
The following judicial decisions mandated clear and convincing evidence or its
equivalent: Dale County Dep't of Pensions & Security v. Robles, 368 So. 2d 39, 42 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1979); Harper v. Caskin, 265 Ark. 558, 560-61, 580 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1979); In re J.S.R.,
374 A.2d 860, 864 (D.C. 1977); Torres v. Van Eepoel, 98 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1957); Blakey
v. Blakey, 72 Ill. App. 3d 946, 947, 391 N.E.2d 222, 223 (1979); In re Kerns, 225 Kan. 746,
753, 594 P.2d 187, 193 (1979); In re Rosenbloom, 266 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn. 1978); In re
J.L.B., 594 P.2d 1127, 1136 (Mont. 1979); In re Souza, 204 Neb. 503, 510, 283 N.W.2d 48, 52
(1979); J. & E. v. M. & F., 157 N.J. Super. 478, 489, 385 A.2d 240, 246 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978); In re J.A., 283 N.W.2d 83, 92 (N.D. 1979); In re Darren Todd H., 615 P.2d 287, 289
(Okla. 1980); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 332, 383 A.2d 1228, 1233, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
880 (1978); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244, 1248
(Utah 1975); In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d 831, 833 (1973); In re X, Y, Z, 607
P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo. 1980).
94. See State v. Robert H., 118 N.H. 713, 716, 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1978); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1603.A (West Supp. 1982).
95. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-537(B) (1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-106
(1973 & Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 16-2009 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.090 (1979);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15 (Vernon 1975).
96. See In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). The Supreme Court of Texas,
citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), noted that the "involuntary termination of
parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights." 596 S.W.2d at 846. Referring to
Addington, the court stated:
The right to enjoy a natural family unit is no less important than the right to
liberty which requires at least a clear and convincing standard of-proof to
inhibit such liberty through involuntary and indefinite confinement in a
mental institution. Termination is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and
gravity that due process requires the state to justify termination of the parentchild relationship by proof more substantial than a preponderance of the
evidence.
Id at 847.
97. See Hernandez v. State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 23 Ariz. App. 32,
530 P.2d 389, 393 (1975); In re N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134, 139-40 (S.D. 1978). In In re G.M.,
596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980), the Supreme Court of Texas did not discuss the child's rights.
98. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-43a (1981); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 571-61 to -63
(1976 & Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-5-4 (Burns Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-15-109 (Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1560 to -1610 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981).
99. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1194 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd
on other groundssub non Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Alsager v. District Ct., 406 F.
Supp. 10, 25 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
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proof requirement and a tendency to dismiss the child's interest on the
ground that it is identical with either the state's or the parents' interest.
II.

SANTOSKY V KAMER

In Santosky v. Kramer the Supreme Court determined that parents deserve the protection of a higher standard of proof in a proceeding to terminate their parental rights than the preponderance of the evidence standard
used in most civil actions. 100 The Court's holding that due process requires
the state to support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence' 0 1 emerged from its analysis of the termination proceeding in light
of the Mathews v. Eldridge10 2 balancing test. Under Mathews a court must
consider the following factors in order to ascertain the requirements of due
process in a particular type of case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
the additional or substitute procedural requirement
burdens that 03
would entail. 1
The Santosky opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, 104 commences with
a discussion of the first element of the Mathews test, the private interest at
stake, which is that of the parents. 105 The extent to which the parents must
be afforded due process, the Court stated, depends upon the extent to
which they may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss.' 10 6 Emphasizing
the finality and irreversibility of a termination decision and the array of
public resources at the state's disposal, 10 7 the Court concluded that the
parents were indeed threatened with grievous loss and, therefore, deserved
100. 102 S. Ct. at 1402, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 617.
101. Id at 1391, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 603.
102. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

103. Id at 335; see also Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (regarding flexibility of due process to meet specific situations).
104. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun in the
majority opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote a forceful dissent in Lassiter, in which the Court

ruled against a parent in a termination proceeding. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981); see supra note 12. In Lassiter Justice Blackmun expressed in his
dissent the same themes that he later incorporated into the majority opinion in Santosky:

A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevocable. Unlike other
custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with no right to visit or communicate
with the child, to participate in, or even to know about, any important decision
affecting the child's religious, educational, emotional, or physical development. . . . Surely there can be few losses more grievous than the abrogation
of parental rights.
452 U.S. at 39-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. 102 S.Ct. at 1397-98, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610-11.
106. Id at 1397, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63
(1970), which quoted Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951)).
107. 102 S.Ct. at 1397, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610.
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heightened procedural protection.10 8
The Court refused, however, to consider the second private interest, the
child's interest in being free from abuse or neglect, as a factor distinct from
the parents' interest.' 0 9 Noting the bifurcated nature of New York's statutory termination process, 10 the Court stated that the fact-finding stage, in
which the state must prove neglect, 1 pits the state directly against the
parents such that the focus is emphatically not on the child." 2 At that
point, the Court noted, the child shares with his parents a vital interest in
preventing an erroneous termination of their natural relationship." l3 Only
after the state establishes parental unfitness may the family court assume
that the interests of parent and child diverge.' 4 Consequently, whatever
procedural protection is appropriate for the parents will also adequately
serve the child's interest during the fact-finding process. As a result, the
Court did not weigh the child's interest separately." 15
The second element of the Mathews test is the risk of erroneous deprivation resulting from the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in
the termination proceeding." 6 The Court found that New York's statutory process increases this risk of error in a number of ways, including the
family court's unusual discretion to weigh facts according to imprecise
substantive standards," 17 the likelihood that cultural or class bias will influence the fact-finder,"18 and the disparity between the resources available
to the state for prosecuting its case and those available to the parents for
mounting a defense. 19 This imbalance of substantive factors in favor of
108. Id at 1398, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 611.
109. Justice Rehnquist noted this omission in his dissent: "On the other side of the termination proceeding are the often countervailing interests of the child." Id at 1412, 71 L. Ed.
2d at 628 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id at 1397-98, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610-11.
111. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 622 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-1982).
112. 102 S. Ct. at 1397, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610.
113. Id at 1398, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 611. The Court noted that in some instances when
parental rights are terminated, the child may lose not only the right to maintenance and
support, for which he may thereafter be dependent upon society, but also the right of inheritance and all other rights inherent in the legal parent-child relationship. Id n. 11.
114. Id at 1398, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 611.
115. Id
116. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 1399, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 612. The conduct and conditions that amount to
neglect defy precise definition. The New York Family Court Act defines a neglected child
as one "whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent
danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent ... to exercise a minimum degree of care in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(o (McKinney 1975). Child neglect statutes typically
define neglect in terms of parental characteristics, parental failure to provide for the child, or
the child's actual condition. See Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Scope of State Child
Neglect Statutes, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 720 (1979); see also Katz, Howe & McGrath,
supra note 90, at 4-5 (neglect defined in both physical and psychological terms).
118. 102 S. Ct. at 1399, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 612-13. The Court noted that parents subject to
termination proceedings are often poor or uneducated. Id
119. Id As the dissent noted, there was no evidence that any of these factors influenced
the outcome of the Santosky termination hearing. Id at 1410 n.ll, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 626 n.ll
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). No actual financial limitations, however, restrict the state in
prosecuting a termination. Id at 1399, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 612-13.
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termination necessitates the use of countervailing procedural safeguards
for the parents' interest in retaining custody; a preponderance standard of
proof falls short of the minimum procedural requirements of due process
because it allocates the risk of error equally between the parents and the
state.' 20 The Court determined that implicit in the selection of a preponderance standard is the mistaken assumption that termination of parental
rights always benefits the child. 21 Because an erroneous termination may
be just as undesirable as an erroneous failure to terminate, the Court held
that the family court must employ a higher standard of proof to reduce the
prejudice in favor of termination.122 In addition, the Court stated that an
increased burden of proof would impress the fact-finder with the importance of his decision, thereby decreasing the chances of erroneous
23
outcomes.1
The final component of the Court's analysis was the state's interest in
the parental rights termination process. The state is concerned with two
factors: first, as parens patriae the state seeks to promote the child's welfare; secondly, the state has a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing
the cost and burden of permanent neglect proceedings. In its role as
parens patriae the state shares the parents' interest in providing the child
with a permanent home and in maintaining the natural familial bonds
whenever possible. Thus, the state's interest, like that of the parents, is
better served by a higher standard of proof, which reduces the likelihood
that the parent-child relationship will be erroneously severed. The Court
also found that requiring the state to meet a greater standard of proof
would have no effect on the speed, form, or cost of the termination proceeding. 124 Finally, the Court stated that a stricter standard of proof
would not increase the administrative burden on the state, particularly in
view of the fact that New York law already required proof by at least clear
and convincing evidence in matters involving much less significant interests, such as the prosecution of traffic violations, without imposing undue
120. Id at 1400, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 614.
121. Id, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 614-15; see Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Weglected"
Children: A Searchfor Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (1975) (coercive
intervention by state may result in greater detriment to the child than if he were allowed to
remain with his parents).
122. 102 S.Ct. at 1402-03, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 617.
123. Id at 1400, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 614 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427
(1979)); see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
124. 102 S. Ct. at 1401, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 615. The Court did not explain this finding but
presumably the state would not put on more or different evidence under a clear and convincmg standard than it would under a preponderance standard; the evidence that it produced
would simply be examined differently, for qualitative rather than quantitative sufficiency.
Id at 1400, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 613. Santosky, viewed in conjunction with Lassiter, may represent an attempt by Justice Blackmun to compensate the parents for the Court's refusal in
Lassiter to assure them of appointed counsel m termination cases. See supra note 104. Another approach to reconciling these cases is the possibility that the Santosky Court considered increased procedural protection for parents to be an adequate and much less expensive
substitute for representation by appointed counsel. See Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 442 U.S. 18, 28 (198 1);
see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (significant state interests in informality, flexibility, and economy need not always be sacrificed to
the requirements of due process).
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administrative burden. 125
Holding that New York's preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof in parental rights termination cases was constitutionally intolerable,
the Court concluded that the due process clause mandates clear and convincing evidence, but not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 26 The Court
explained that some state legislatures might find the difficulty in many
cases of proving neglect beyond a reasonable doubt to be an unreasonable
barrier to legitimate state efforts to protect permanently neglected chilare nevertheless free to impose the highest standren.1 27 Individual states
1 28
dard if they so choose.
Justice Rebnquist dissented on two grounds. 129 First, he argued that the
majority opinion invited future federal court intrusion into every facet of
state family law. 1 30 Noting the Court's historic solicitude toward state legislatures in family matters,13 ' Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court, having fixed the standard of proof in parental rights termination proceedings,
32
would now be called upon to evaluate other aspects of such proceedings. 1
The result, he suggested, would be to discourage the social and economic
experimentation of the various states, which in the past have served as
laboratories for trying novel solutions in the family law area without risk
to the rest of the country.' 33 Secondly, Justice Rehnquist took issue with
the majority's conclusion that the New York statutory scheme violated the
Santoskys' due process rights. 134 Although he agreed with the majority
that the fourteenth amendment protects the parents' interest in their relationship with their children, Justice Rehnquist stated that the requirements
of due process must be ascertained by examining all state procedural protections and not by focusing on a single provision of the state statute.135 He
noted that a lengthy and complicated process precedes any order terminating parental rights under the New York statutes,136 and that all state efforts
125. 102 S. Ct. at 1401-02, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 615-16 (citing N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 227.1

(McKinney Supp. 1981)).
126. 102 S. Ct. at 1402, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 616-17.
127. Id, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 617.
128. Id at 1403, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 617.
129. Id Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist
in the dissent.
130. Id
131. Id at 1403, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 618 (citing United States v. Yazel, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966)).
132. 102 S. Ct. at 1404, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 619.
133. Id
134. Id at 1403-14, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 617-30.
135. Id. at 1405, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 620.
136. Id at 1406-08, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 621-24. The family court has no jurisdiction over a
child unless action has been taken to remove him temporarily from his parents' custody and
place him in the care of a state agency. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 614(l)(b) (McKinney 1975 &
Supp. 1981-1982). Temporary removal, when it occurs without the parents' consent, entails
a notice and hearing procedure, which the statute carefully delineates and which provides
the parents with many procedural protections as well as court-appointed counsel, if necessary. Seeid §§ 262(a)(i), 1012-1048; N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney Supp. 19811982). The statute requires regular review of a temporary removal order. Id § 392(2). Only
after the child has been in the state's custody for a year or more may the state seek termina-
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prior to the termination proceeding are carried out in pursuit of the stated
goal of ultimately reuniting the child with his parents by encouraging the
parents to resume a role of responsibility. 37 Justice Rehnquist observed
that in the Santoskys' case the state adhered to all of the statutory procedures and, in addition, made available to the Santoskys numerous opportunities for training and counseling designed to enhance their ability to
care for their children; the Santoskys responded only sporadically to some
of these offerings and not at all to the others. 38 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the New York parental rights termination procedure, taken as
a whole, afforded the Santoskys the fundamental fairness that constitutes
due process. 139 Furthermore, he argued, the statutory preponderance of
the evidence standard reflects a constitutionally permissible attempt to balance the legitimate interests of both parent and child, neither of which is so
clearly paramount as to require the allocation of a greater risk of error to
40
one or the other.'

While parents are clearly entitled to due process in proceedings to terminate their rights in their children, the Santosky decision upheld the parents' rights at the possible expense of the legitimate interests of both the
child and the state. Santosky is thus clear evidence of what the Court has
previously asserted: child welfare litigation is an area in which the individual states, rather than federal courts, are best able to accommodate
competing interests and decide any constitutional questions that may
arise.' 4' The Court acknowledged this fact in Santosky when it stated that
it
each state should determine for itself what standard of proof, if 14any,
2
would demand above and beyond clear and convincing evidence.
The Santosky decision is likely to have limited practical effect. A family
court judge confronted with evidence of abuse or neglect of the sort that
the state presented in Santosky 14 3 could reasonably be expected to determine that the abuse or neglect has occurred and then couch his final order
in the language of the appropriate standard of proof such that the standard
of proof specified by statute has no effect on the outcome of the termination of parental rights. Id § 384-b(4)(c). The state must notify the parents of its action, the
potential outcome of the termination proceeding, and the parents' right to appointed coun-

sel. Id § 384-b(3)(e). The proceeding consists of an initial fact-finding hearing to determine
whether the child is neglected and, if neglect is established, a dispositional hearing to determine the best placement for the child. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 622, 623 (McKinney 1975
& Supp. 1981-1982). Any termination order may, of course, be appealed to higher courts.
137. 102 S. Ct. at 1407-08, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 623 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)).
138. 102 S. Ct. at 1408-10, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 624-25.
139. Id at 1410, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 625-26.
140. Id. at 1410-13, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 626-30.
141. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979).
142. 102 S. Ct. at 1403, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 617.
143. Two of the three Santosky children taken into the state's temporary custody exhibited conditions ranging from broken bones, bruises, cuts, and abrasions to malnutrition and
multiple pinpricks. As a result of the older children's condition, the state removed the third
child from his parents' custody when he was only three days old. Id at 1408-09 n. 10, 71 L.
Ed. 2d at 624 n. 10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tion proceeding. 44 The Court's express refusal to state an opinion on the
merits of the Santoskys' case 145 indicates its uncertainty as to whether, on
remand, the new standard of proof would result in any change in the lower
court's decision. If, however, the increased standard of proof creates a notable difference in the outcome of termination proceedings, it will be because the risk of an erroneous decision not to terminate has shifted such
that the risk weighs heavily against the child.' 4 6 The clear and convincing
evidence standard, the historic presumption in favor of allowing parents to
retain custody of their children, 47 and the frequent difficulty of obtaining
proof of neglect when its existence is not in doubt4948 combine to limit the
neglected child's rights in a termination hearing.1
Santosky's greater significance lies in the precedent it sets for treatment
of future parental rights termination cases and family law matters in general. Its potential effect is twofold. First, the Court, perceiving the state as
hostile to the interests of parent and child in keeping the family together,
clearly indicated that a child has no interest distinct from his parents' interest that is worthy of due process protection during the fact-finding stage
of a termination case.' 50 In so holding, the Court seemed to disregard the
very purpose of such a proceeding, which is to protect the child from
abuse, neglect, or similar threats to his well-being. ' 5 ' If the Court is willing to abandon a child's interests in matters in which the child is one of the
most interested parties, this attitude is likely to pervade other decisions
when children's interests are in jeopardy. Sanlosky may thus represent a
guardreversal of the recent tendency of the Court to acknowledge, albeit
152
edly on some occasions, that children have constitutional rights.
Secondly, in setting the standard of proof in a child custody proceeding,
the Court in Santosky broke with its tradition of nonintervention with re144. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist observed that the standard of proof in a parental
rights termination proceeding under the New York statute is relatively insignificant in comparison to standards of proof in other areas of litigation. This is so because the same judge
normally presides over a child custody case from the time of the state's initial petition for
temporary removal until the final order terminating parental rights; he is therefore "intimately familiar" with the facts of the case and better able to make an accurate judgment
without relying on a standard of proof to guide his decision. Id at 1411 n. 12, 71 L. Ed. 2d at
627 n.12.
145. Id at 1403, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 617.
146. Cf Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), in which the Court noted that it has at
times struck down statutes that unfairly shifted the burden of proof.
147. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also supra text accompanying note
22.
148. See Paulsen, The Legal Frameworkfor Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679,
697-701 (1966).
149. See Note, supra note 59, at 569; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
150. 102 S. Ct. at 1397-98, 1400, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 610-11, 613-14.
151. See id at 1412-14, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 628-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (minor seeking abortion may attempt
to show court that she is mature and informed enough to make abortion decision without
parental consent); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (no state interest
justified statutory imposition of blanket parental consent requirement regarding abortions
for unmarried minors); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1966) (juvenile delinquency adjudication
must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment).
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gard to family matters. 53 As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent,
federal courts historically intervene only in cases in which a clear constitutional violation has occurred.' 54 Creating a constitutional issue out of the
standard of proof in a civil proceeding when the interest in question already commands the support of precedent, presumption, and statutory
procedural protection broadens the Court's authority for interfering in
areas historically reserved to the states.' 55 While the majority denied this
a precedent for future federal
charge,' 56 the Santosky decision established
57
intervention into family court matters.'
III.

CONCLUSION

In Santosky v. Kramer the Supreme Court held that in a proceeding for
the involuntary termination of parental rights, a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is constitutionally inadequate. Instead, the Court
held that the state in prosecuting a termination case must prove its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. In so holding, the Court
reaffirmed the deep-seated notion that parents have a fundamental right to
the care and custody of their children, and that this right is of constitutional dimension. Implicit in the opinion was the view that children have
very few due process rights. Moreover, the decision represents an unprecedented invasion of family court procedure, which may signify the onset of
increased federal involvement in areas of law traditionally left to state
control.
Ann E. Ward

153. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). Only a year earlier the Court

refused to consider the question presented by Santosky. See Doe v. Delaware, 450 U.S. 382
(1981). The Court, after granting certiorari in Doe, dismissed the matter for want of a properly presented federal question. Id Justices Brennan and Stevens, who joined Justice Blackmun in
154.
155.
156.

the Santosky majority, filed dissents to the dismissal of Doe.
102 S. Ct. at 1404, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 619.
Id
Id at 1402 n.18, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 616 n.18.

157. Id at 1404, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 619 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

